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This paper provides a review of the relevant literature pertaining to the use of gambits (tactics) in 
negotiations. The review reveals some problems in the literature as discussed within the framework of 
Goldstein’s model of selection, implementation, evaluation, and feedback. Key problems in the gambit 
literature include the lack of empirical research on the choice of gambits and the difficulty of 
measurement of the effectiveness of gambits due to multivariate problems. Implications for future 
research follow.   
 
 
A gambit is a chess term referring to the moves used to gain an advantage (Dawson, 1987). In 
negotiations, gambits refer to the specific tactics that help achieve negotiation objectives. For example, 
some gambits include the compromise, walking away from negotiations, trading off, setting aside hard 
issues first, accepting the first offer, automatically rejecting the first offer, and acting kind while not 
giving an inch. Another gambit may be a “flinch,” which is a strong negative physical reaction to a 
proposal by the opponent that is implemented with the intent to obtain a more favorable outcome from the 
other party.   
Negotiators have many of gambits at their disposal. They may implement many of them or only a few 
in order to achieve their negotiation objectives. Negotiators have to decide what gambits are most likely 




Unfortunately, existing research is not clear why certain gambits should be used in certain negotiation 
situations. Furthermore, research is not clear how to evaluate if a gambit or set of gambits that have been 
used achieved negotiation objectives.  
According to Coburn (2010), prior to the 1980's, many researchers focused their research on the use of 
specific gambits. A variety of gambits were defined and negotiators were told to choose whatever gambits 
they saw fit. More recent negotiation research has considered contextual variables of negotiation 
situations such as short-term versus long-term negotiation relationships and the search for win-win versus 
win-lose relationships in selecting gambits. There needs to be a greater rationale for negotiators to use 
various gambits in negotiations. Supposedly, if negotiators had a more systematic basis for selection of 
gambits in negotiations, they would be more successful in achieving their objectives. 
 Accordingly, this study describes how existing research has grown in analyzing gambits and continues 
to be deficient in describing what gambits to use when and how to evaluate gambits. It also will provide 
suggestions for future research to begin to tackle difficult problems for researchers and practitioners. 
 
Figure 1: Gambit Model 
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Kaupins and Johnson                                                                                                                                                     Advances in Business Research 




Framework for the Literature Review 
 
To help describe the strengths and deficiencies in the literature, this study provides a framework for 
the literature review through an adaptation of Goldstein’s Training Model (Goldstein, 1993). The 
adaptation is shown in Figure 1 above. In the Gambit Assessment Phase, a negotiation needs assessment 
is followed by the setting of negotiation objectives. In the Gambit Use Phase, appropriate gambits are 
selected for negotiations and are used. In the Evaluation Phase, overall negotiation objectives and 
individual gambits are evaluated. The Feedback Loop involves keeping records of negotiations and 
gambits used for future retrieval in later negotiations. 
The model has several characteristics. First, it is simple and contains only four steps. Second, some 
variation of it can be found in chapters on training in human resource management texts (i.e., Dessler, 
2011, Mathis and Jackson, 2011)  and research articles on health and other areas (i.e., Wang, et. al., 
2008). Third, the model has been used in some form in a variety of training programs (Mathis and 
Jackson, 2011).  
Related models in the literature include the ADDIE model that involves analysis, design, development, 
implementation, and evaluation of training methods (Learning-theories.com, 2010). Prominent other 
instructional system development (ISD) methodologies similar to Goldstein (1993) include Gagné and 
Briggs (1974), and Mager (1962), Context, Input, Process, Product (CIPP) Model (Worthen and Sanders, 
1987); Training Validation System (TVS) Approach (Fitz-Enz, 1994); and Input, Process, Output, 
Outcome (IPO) Model (Bushnell, 1990). 
For the purposes of this study, the model is useful as a structure for discussion of the literature review 
in negotiation gambits. Based on the literature review, a more detailed analysis of what is needed in future 




Gambit Assessment Phase 
 
The negotiation process begins with the gambit assessment phase. Negotiators assess the need for 
negotiations and setting negotiation objectives. The need for negotiations might be established in required 
talks at the end of a contract, formal grievances, or other dispute situations between parties. Negotiations 
might not be needed where initial proposals are considered acceptable. According to Robbins and Judge 
(2011), negotiators should set a target point that is the ultimate realistic goal. A resistance point might 
also be set that is the point in which the negotiator would not compromise any further. Ideal objectives 
should be specific, measurable, achievable, realistic, and timely using the SMART acronym 
(learnmarketing.net, 2011).  
 
Gambit Selection and Use Phase 
 
In the gambit selection and use phase, a negotiator would select gambits and then actually use them 
when negotiating. The Goldstein model allows for a wide variety of considerations in selecting 
appropriate gambits in this case. Gambits could be selected based on the type of negotiation, knowledge 
of the other party’s negotiation approaches, the time frame of negotiations, the importance of the 
outcomes, negotiators’ experiences, the history of negotiations with the other party, possible future 
negotiations with the other party, the influence of constituents (i.e., higher management, unions, 
customers, employees, vendors), and time and cost constraints. Once the considerations have been made, 
the negotiator(s) would select the gambit or gambits that would be most appropriate in the beginning, 
middle, and end of negotiations.   
Though the research literature identifies and discusses many gambits and recommends which gambits 
are generally the most effective, it has provided little guidance in terms of systematic ways of choosing 
them for a particular negotiation setting. Most of the recommendations provided in the literature merely 
show which gambits should generally be used during negotiations. This basically equates to the 
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traditional “one best way” approach to the use of gambits. Little information in the literature has 
examined situational variables that would impact the effectiveness of different gambits. It certainly seems 
reasonable that the effectiveness of different gambits would vary depending on the type of negotiations 
taking place. For instance, certain gambits are likely to be effective for single negotiation settings but 
could prove detrimental to multiple event negotiations in the future. The following three pages summarize 
the literature regarding gambit recommendations. 
Win-Win Gambits. One group of studies recommends that negotiators focus on win-win style 
negotiations. This approach uses gambits with the goal to satisfy both of the parties’ needs, where both 
sides believe and feel they have accomplished the outcome they wanted. Win-win negotiations also are 
commonly referred to using a number of other terms including integrative bargaining (Walton and 
McKersie, 1965), both-win management (Karrass and Glasser, 1980), mutual gains enterprise (Kochan 
and Osterman, 1994), nonzero-sum games (Katz and Kochan, 2004), and soft positions (Fisher and Ury, 
1981).   
As an example, assume two sisters both want the single orange left in their family fruit basket 
(Robbins and Judge, 2012). The sisters could negotiate using a number of negotiation styles. They could 
compete, where one party forces or persuades the other to give up the orange. Alternatively, they could 
compromise, each getting part of what they wanted, by cutting the orange in half. Another alternative is 
they could use the win-win gambit (integrative bargaining), by talking things through and gaining an 
appreciation of the others needs and demonstrating an interest in satisfying both sides’ concerns with both 
getting what they want. Is this possible? It is if during their negotiations, the sisters have open and honest 
discussions and thus discover that one sister only wants the peels of the orange to use to make a cake, 
while her sister only wants the pulp and juice to make orange juice.  
The win-win approach can always be use although the win-win outcome won’t always be possible. 
Nonetheless, when both parties in a negation are interested in making a fair deal and recognize that the 
competing approach is not likely to result in such an outcome, a satisfactory outcome for both parties is 
more likely to be achieved. However, the approach used will depend on a number of contextual variables. 
Ethical and Unethical Gambits. Another group of studies focuses on the perceived degree of 
ethicalness of using different gambits. Kaupins and Johnson (2003) identified seventeen negotiation 
gambits and had upper-division, non-traditions students, who were enrolled in courses involving labor 
negotiations, rate each gambit on their ethicalness. Using a Likert-type scale where 1 = very unethical,     
2 = ethical, 3 = neutral, 4 = somewhat ethical, and 5 = very unethical, none of the mean ratings for any of 
the negotiation gambits were in the very ethical range (4.5 or above). Only three gambits were in the 
range (3.50 to 4.49) that the researchers considered to be “somewhat ethical.” These gambits were hiring 
an expert negotiator (4.15), the reluctance of the negotiator to sign the first offer, even if satisfied with it 
(3.76), and asking for specifics regarding what it would take to close the deal (3.68). Eight of the 
seventeen gambits were rated in the “neutral” range (2.50 to 3.49), while the remaining six gambits were 
rated in the “somewhat unethical” range (1.50 to 2.49). Kaupins and Johnson (2003) concluded that only 
three gambits could be considered somewhat ethical, while eight others should be considered neutral on 
ethicalness. Thus 11 of the gambits could be recommended while the use of the six falling into the 
“somewhat unethical” group should be discouraged. 
Robinson et al., (2000) analyzed the ethicalness of gambits based on the ratings of undergraduate 
students. These researchers factor analyzed sixteen gambits and found that the larger set of gambits could 
be reduced to five factor groups. The highest rated factor was labeled “traditional competitive bargaining” 
with a mean ethical rating of 5.50 (where 1 = not at all appropriate to 7 = very appropriate scale). The 
four other factors had substantially lower mean ratings for ethicalness; each averaging around 
approximately 3.00 and below. They included the factors labeled “attacking opponent’s network,” “false 
promises,” “misrepresentation,” and “inappropriate information gathering.” An example of the traditional 
bargaining gambit is when a negotiator makes an opening demand that is far greater than what he/she 
really hoped to get. A false promises gambit occurs when one party guarantees that his/her constituency 
will uphold the settlement agreed upon, although the party has little or no believe that that will occur. A 
misrepresentation gambit occurs when one party intentionally misrepresent information to her opponent. 
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The attacking ones opponent’s network tactic involves the attempt to embarrass or get an opponent 
removed from his position. Lastly, the inappropriate information gathering gambit involves efforts to 
illicitly gain information about an opponent’s negotiating position by paying money to, or providing gifts 
to “someone-in-the-know” from the other party’s camp in exchange for information 
 Fallacy Gambits. Another group of studies focuses on gambits that are considered “fallacies.” 
Fallacies are statements that can be used in negotiations to influence the other party and therefore are 
gambits. The use of these negotiation gambits are discouraged because of their deceptive nature. 
According to Engel (1994) major categories of fallacies include ambiguity, presumption, and relevance.  
An example of ambiguity is a “double meaning.” A negotiator might state “I dispense with accuracy.”  
Does this mean he or she is always truthful or always deceptive? An example of presumption is “begging 
the question.” A negotiator might say “I believe in dental benefits because everybody believes in dental 
benefits.” Does everybody really believe in dental benefits? An example of relevance is the genetic 
fallacy in which a conclusion is “proved” false by considering its source. A negotiator might state that 
“Our workers provide lousy proposals because they don’t have a college education.” Such unsupported 
arguments are made despite the reality that not all workers who have only a high school education 
provide bad proposals. 
 Jacobs (1994) groups inappropriate gambits into persuasive words, fallacies, and intent signals. 
Persuasive words include the double-bind which gives the listener an illusory freedom of choice between 
only two choices. Fallacies include the false cause. For example, a negotiator may make the statement 
that “Workers have failed us and that is why we have layoffs.” This assertion may ignore factors outside 
of the workers’ control such as a poor product design, competition, shifts in demand, and a recessionary 
economy. Intent signals involve the intention of the speaker affecting the accuracy of the information. An 
example is “us” versus “them” in which everything done by the other side is considered wrong. 
 Information Economics. Information economics investigate how information affects an economy and 
economic decisions (Allen, 1990). There are several subfields in the area related to gambits. One of them 
is associated with signaling. In negotiations, a signal is designed to reduce or eliminate asymmetry of 
information between two or more parties. Negotiations can go awry if one or more parties have an 
imbalance in information (Spence, 1973). Accordingly, gambits related to signaling would provide 
greater information to the other side. An example would be the background of the negotiators (whether 
they had negotiation experience or not).   
 In another subfield called screening, the under-informed party induces the other party to reveal their 
information (Stiglitz, 1975). Accordingly, gambits related to screening would provide greater information 
about the other side. An example would be inquiring about the background about the people you are 
negotiating with (the amount of negotiating experience). 
 Decision Tree. Wall (1985) collected over a hundred negotiation tactics (gambits) and organized them 
into five categories: (1) irrational tactics (tactics that appear illogical such as illogical arguing and failing 
to consider costly opponent threats), (2) debate tactics such as structural (center upon personal 
relationships and the issues), joint-problem solving, and competitive, (3) aggressive tactics involving 
threat and coercive, (4) nonaggressive bargaining tactics such as conciliatory and reward, and (5) 
posturing tactics such as tough, soft, and neutral. A sixth higher order category of gambits, rational 
tactics, is identified by Wall (1985) and includes debate, aggressive, nonaggressive, and posturing tactics 
but excludes irrational tactics. 
 Wall (1985) developed a four stage decision tree that leads to recommended negotiation tactics based 
on the yes or no answers to four questions. The yes or no answers to each of the four decision tree 
questions will lead to different branches and therefore a different recommended gambit or gambits. 
Questions include: (1) Is opponent engaging in inappropriate behavior? (2) Is opponent contingently 
cooperative? (3) Are future negotiations important? and (4) Does your opponent have limited 
alternatives? (p. 78). For example, if the answer is “yes” to each of the questions and (1) an opponent is 
engaging in appropriate behavior, (2) is contingently cooperative, (3) future negotiations are important, 
and (4) the opponent has limited alternatives, the resulting decision tree branch leads one to the 
recommended gambit, reward. Reward gambits include tactics such as making concession, making straw 
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issues in order to lose them, making concessions early in negotiations, using open communications, and 
conferring status upon the opponent (Wall, 1985, p. 56). At the other extreme on the decision tree, if the 
answer to each of the four questions is “no”, then the resulting branches leads one to the recommendation 
to use the gambits of debate and/or soft or neutral posturing (Wall, 1985, p. 56). 
 Other Gambit Recommendations. Many other gambits can be found in Coburn (2010), Farrington 
(2010), Bisineer (2009) and at Web sites such as Negotiationtactics.net (2010) and Syque.com (2009). 
These sources provide short lists of gambits with accompanying definitions of the gambits. Some of these 
sources also provide discussions pertaining to the ethicalness or the effectiveness of the gambits. Coburn 
(2010), in particular, discusses the ways negotiators can counter gambits that are used on them. Many 
labor relations texts also have lists of recommended gambits, e.g., Sloan and Witney (2004); Holley, 
Jennings, and Wolters (2008); Carrell and Heavrin (2010). Some popular books including recommended 
gambits are McCormack (1995), Bazerman and Lewicki 1983), Urey (1993), Hindle (1998), Dewdney 
(1993), Lakhani (2005), Reardon (2004), Bazerman (2007), and Thompson (1998). 
Negotiators also can consider using gambits they have used during previous negotiations - whether 
bargaining with a salesperson for a car, with a boss for a pay raise, with a spouse for a family budget, or a 
teen age child about his or her curfew. Negotiations abound, and so do the use of gambits. Each contact 
can provide examples of good or poor negotiations that the negotiators might remember and be able to 
retrieve on demand. 
 Another source for negotiation gambits are professional negotiators, mediators, fact finders, and 
arbitrators. They can provide specific strategies that have worked for them in organizations such as the 
American Arbitration Association, National Academy of Arbitrators, Industrial Relations Research 
Association, National Mediation Board, and the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service. Negotiation 
classes such as labor relations (Businessschools.com, 2009), sales, law enforcement, real estate and other 
professions (Wisegeek.com, 2010) can list some gambits that have worked. 
 
Gambit Evaluation Phase 
 
After negotiations are completed, the evaluation phase involves having negotiators evaluate how well 
they have achieved their negotiation objectives and how well the gambits have contributed to their 
negotiation objectives. Here are some aspects of the gambits that need to be evaluated: 
 
1. Did the opponent react negatively or not at all with one of the gambits?  
2. Did a gambit or combination of gambits lead to breaking a negotiation logjam and leading 
negotiations in a positive direction?   
3. Did the employment of a gambit or gambits damage the working relationship between your 
organization and the other party who has been an important long-term vendor of your firm?  
 
There are several approaches negotiators can use to answer the questions just listed. Kirkpatrick’s 
model (Kirkpatrick, 1959; Kirkpatrick and Kirkpatrick, 2006) follows the goal-based evaluation approach 
that has been integrated into Goldstein’s evaluation phase. It identifies levels of evaluation which include 
(1) reaction, (2) learning, (3) behavior, and (4) results. The four levels will be applied to negotiation 
evaluation below: 
 
1. Reaction. Negotiators can evaluate gambits by first simply asking fellow negotiators (through 
questionnaire, individual interview, or group interview) about what they think of each gambit. This is 
the easiest information to collect about each gambit. 
2. Learning. Negotiators can evaluate gambits by asking if the use of gambits allowed them to gain any 
knowledge about the other side. Does use of a gambit lead to information such as target points or 
resistance points? 
3. Behavior. Negotiators can evaluate gambits by analyzing if an individual gambit affected the 
behavior of the other side. This may be difficult to evaluate. For some gambits such as the flinch, the 
other side might immediately react with a response. With other gambits such as a compromise, the 
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other side might take days or months to react. Furthermore, the compromise gambit might be 
combined with several other gambits so the influence of one gambit might not be totally clear. 
4. Results. Lastly, what were the results or outcomes from the negotiation? Were the negotiation 
objectives achieved? If so, to what extent? If not, why not? How did the gambits as a whole lead to 




According to the Association to Advance Collegiate Schools of Business (2010) Eligibility Procedures 
and Accreditation Standards, the feedback loop back to the assessment phase is also known as closing the 
loop. The feedback loop is one of the most important aspects of Goldstein’s Model. When negotiations 
have been completed, successful and unsuccessful aspects of those negotiations are often forgotten for 
future negotiations. This feedback loop phase ensures that lessons learned from the past are not forgotten. 
Records of prior negotiations and gambits should be kept in this phase so they can be retrieved for the 
assessment phase of future negotiations. Individuals should be clearly assigned to keep the records and 




Goldstein’s Model provides a general framework for assessing negotiation objectives, selecting and 
using gambits, evaluating negotiations and gambits, and providing a feedback loop. This general 
framework leaves many details for some useful future research papers. 
The gambit assessment phase requires future research involving the intent to use gambits at all based 
on negotiation objectives set. Should gambits be used to achieve objectives or are there some other means 
of achieving objectives by simply agreeing with the proposal?  
The gambit selection phase requires significant future research on why negotiators should pick one 
gambit over the next one. This phase is rooted on the assessment phase that sets basic negotiation 
objectives and target points. Some of the variables that may be considered for future decision tree 
frameworks and studied through surveys and experiments may include the following: 
   
1. Is the opponent engaging in inappropriate behavior? 
2. Is the opponent contingently cooperative? 
3. Is future negotiation important? 
4. Does the opponent have limited alternatives? 
5. What is the time frame of negotiations?  
6. What is the importance of the outcomes? 
7. How experienced are the negotiators? 
8. What are the negotiator’s demographics such as age, race, gender, etc.? 
9. Has there been past success in negotiations? 
   
The gambit evaluation phase requires significant research concerning when certain gambits are 
effective in negotiations. For example, the flinch gambit is a strong negative reaction to a proposal that is 
often used at the beginning of negotiations. It might be very effective in front of people who are very 
inexperienced in negotiating and are unaware of this particular tactic. But this same negotiation tactic 
might be very counterproductive with experienced negotiators who are quite aware that this tactic can be 
done.  Just to do research on the flinch gambit, many research questions come up such as the following: 
 
1. Is the flinch more appropriate in formal or informal settings? 
2. With what demographic groups would the flinch be most effective in terms of gender, age, race, and 
religion? 
3. At what time of negotiations would the flinch be most effective? 
4. How strong should the flinch be (mild, moderate, very strong)? 
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5. Should a flinch involve verbal only or be combined with physical gestures such as hand, and 
eyebrows? 
6. How often should a flinch be repeated in a negotiation? 
7. Can there be variations in a flinch in a negotiation? 
8. What type of personality would use the flinch more effectively?  Type A or Type B? 
 
As shown by the list, a problem with gambit research is that there are many variables that need be 
covered on each particular gambit. Furthermore, isolation of the effectiveness of one gambit would be 
difficult because many gambits might be used on a particular negotiation. 
Finally, the feedback loop is an ignored topic in negotiation research. Future research needs to analyze 
what negotiation records (gambits, strategies, various offers) are kept from prior negotiations that are 
needed to set goals for the assessment phase in the next negotiations. Future research also needs to 
analyze who is typically in charge of retrieving records of past negotiation gambit use. 
                                                   
Conclusion 
 
 Goldstein provides a model that can be adapted to the negotiation setting. In the assessment phase, the 
need for negotiations should be established and negotiation objectives should be set. In the gambit use 
phase, gambits must be selected and used. Existing literature on negotiation gambits focus on win-win 
gambits, ethical and unethical gambits, fallacy gambits, and other gambit recommendations based on 
decision trees and short lists of recommended gambits. There are very few systematic approaches to 
modeling what would be the best gambits for what situations. Sources of gambits include personal 
experience, other negotiation professionals, and the literature. In the evaluation phase, the reactions and 
behaviors of the other party can be evaluated as well as the results of the negotiations. These can help 
determine whether the gambits have been successful. There is a feedback loop where records of the 
results of the evaluation phase go back to the assessment phase to facilitate organization learning to 
improve the appropriate use of gambits in future negotiations. Future research should investigate the 
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